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From the United States’ point of view, the Compacts of Free 
Association negotiated from the 1960s to the 1990s were 
primarily strategic in nature, with the United States Department 
of Defense closely involved at every stage of the negotiations. 
The compact states, after all, were part of the world’s only 
United Nations strategic trust territory from 1947, a status that 
enabled the United States to conduct nuclear experiments there 
from 1946 to 1958, with health consequences for some Marshall 
Islanders that linger to this day. The compact states remain 
strategically vital to the United States. As the Department of 
State’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Australia, New Zealand and 
the Pacific Islands Sandra Oudkirk told the United States House 
Foreign Affairs Committee in 2019, the compact states ‘form a 
strategic bridge that stretches from Hawai’i to the Philippines, 
a span larger than the breadth of the continental United States’ 
and the United States’ ‘relationship with the Freely Associated 
States—underpinned by our respective Compacts—is a strategic 
component of our position in the Indo-Pacific’ (Oudkirk 2019). 
The Compacts of Free Association are both permanent and 
renegotiable. The compacts themselves last indefinitely unless 
terminated by both sides, giving Washington a veto. But their 
financial provisions—the compact funds that underwrite much 
of government expenditure—end in 2023 for the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) and 2024 for the Republic of Palau (Palau). The United 
States’ position has long been to render the RMI and the FSM 
financially independent by the mid-2020s, replacing compact 
funds with income from permanent trust funds. Much effort 
has gone into attempting to achieve this goal through the Joint 
Economic Management Committee in the FSM and the Joint 
Economic Management and Fiscal Accountability Committee in 
the RMI, but the countries’ economies are too fragile for this to 
be possible (Joshua 14 September 2018). They remain highly 
aid dependent. As the title of a 2019 United States Government 
Accountability Office report puts it, Trust Funds for Micronesia 
and the Marshall Islands Are Unlikely to Fully Replace Expiring 
US Annual Grant Assistance (US GAO 2019).  
Current arrangements offer the compact states nothing 
more than survival on inadequate trust funds, opening an 
opportunity for other players such as China to come to their 
rescue. The Department of State’s position is that ‘as the 
scheduled end of US economic assistance is fast approaching, 
now is not the time to leave these small sovereign partner nations 
open to the predations of larger countries’ (Oudkirk 2019). The 
United States’ perception of this threat was heightened by 
the defection of two Pacific countries—Solomon Islands and 
Kiribati—from recognition of Taiwan to China in September 
2019, which seemed to serve as a precedent for Palau and the 
RMI to follow suit. Palau’s economy rests in part on tourism and 
suffered considerable losses when in 2017 China instructed tour 
operators not to book package tours to Palau because it is not 
on the official list of approved destinations for Chinese travellers. 
This move was widely interpreted as an attempt to pressure Palau 
on its recognition policy. In the case of the RMI, China is seeking 
similar results by imposing extra taxes on RMI-badged vessels 
entering Chinese ports, conforming with its policy towards ships 
from Taiwan-recognising states (Grossman et al. 2019:40).
Hence, in recent months, negotiations have begun over 
renewing the financial provisions of the compacts. Their countries’ 
relationships with the United States were central to discussions 
when the Micronesian presidents—Tommy Remengesau Jr 
(Palau), David Penuelo (FSM) and Hilda Heine (RMI) —met the 
United States president in May 2019, the first time all three 
Micronesian leaders had been together at the White House. 
Veteran Palauan leader Thomas Remengesau Jr emphasised 
that his country’s:
steadfast reliability makes Palau and the other Freely 
Associated States natural allies in the Pentagon’s 
new Indo-Pacific strategy, a plan to counter Chinese 
expansionism and its militarization of islands in the 
region (Remengesau 17 May 2019).
In August 2019, Mike Pompeo became the first United States 
Secretary of State to visit Micronesia. At Kolonia in Pohnpei he 
announced that the United States had begun negotiating an 
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extension of the compacts, which ‘sustain democracy in the face 
of Chinese efforts to redraw the Pacific’. In October, Washington 
despatched a team of negotiators to begin talks over the 
compact with Palau. Soon afterwards, United States officials 
were in Micronesia on a Compact Listening Tour seeking the 
Micronesian perspective on new arrangements. 
Meeting with Pacific Island leaders on the sidelines of the 
United Nations General Assembly in September 2019, Pompeo 
announced US$65 million in new assistance to the region as part 
of the Pacific Pledge, a United States counterpart to Australia’s 
Pacific Step-Up and New Zealand’s Pacific Reset. The pledge 
is worth US$100 million in total. At the same time, the United 
States will embed security advisers in Palau, Fiji and Solomon 
Islands and USAID will expand its presence in Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea as well as the FSM, the RMI and Palau. Ironically, 
given the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on 
climate change, the United States aid announcement specifically 
recognises threats to the region caused by sea level rise (US 
Department of State 3 October 2019).
The nuclear issue is sure to arise in the RMI’s negotiations 
with the United States. The RMI observes Nuclear Victims 
Remembrance Day each year, and the 2020 march for justice 
led by President David Kabua had the theme ‘we will not forget 
and we will not be deterred’ (Hosia 6 March 2020). The RMI 
will almost certainly seek a reopening of discussions about 
nuclear compensation in the new compact. All three compact 
states will want continued visa-free access to the United States 
and will also seek a continuation of the discretionary federal 
programs that are paid in addition to compact funds which help 
to support education, health, infrastructure and research. They 
may also want an extension of the social and medical benefits 
for Micronesians living in the United States such as Medicaid, 
for which they are presently ineligible. Whatever their demands 
might be, the rise of China in the Pacific means that the United 
States is likely to listen carefully.
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